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Abstract:  
We present results from a real-effort experiment, simulating actual work-place 
conditions, comparing the productivity of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. 
Workers, who were paid to enter data, were exposed to different degrees of peer 
pressure under both payment systems. The peer pressure was generated in the form of 
private information about the productivity of their peers. We have two main results. First, 
we find no level of peer pressure for which the productivity of either male or female 
workers is significantly higher than productivity without peer pressure. Second, we find 
that very low and very high levels of peer pressure can significantly decrease 
productivity (particularly for men paid fixed wages). These results are consistent with 
models of conformism and self-motivation. 
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1 Introduction
The economic study of personnel policies and work-place productivity has traditionally con-
centrated on monetary incentive mechanisms. Theorists have studied the ability of piece-rate
contracts (eg. Stiglitz, 1975), tournaments (eg. Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and termination con-
tracts (eg. MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) to induce productive behaviour on the part of
workers.1 Recently, however, economists have become increasingly interested in how workers
modify their behaviour in the presence of information on the productivity of other workers
(eg. Kandel and Lazear, 1992). If workers respond to peer effects, a firm can hope to raise the
productivity of its workers by making publicly available information about worker productiv-
ity without having to relate pay to individual or group productivity. Experiments have proven
to be particularly useful for empirical work in this area, allowing researchers to exogenously
vary elements that would be difficult to observe in a real firm (eg. Falk and Ichino, 2006).2
The exogenous manipulation of peer effects circumvents several identification problems which
complicate the measurement of peer effects using naturally occurring data (Manski, 1993).
In this paper, we use experimental methods to analyse the effects of peer pressure on worker
performance. During the experiment, male and female workers were paid to enter data on
computer terminals. Performance was measured on the basis of the amount of data entered
(controlling for quality). The experiment was completed in four treatments, varying the com-
pensation system and the amount of peer pressure that each worker was subject to. Workers in
the first and second treatments were paid, respectively, under fixed wages and piece rates, both
in the absence of peer pressure. Workers in the third and fourth treatments were paid, respec-
tively, under fixed wages and piece rates and were exposed to peer pressure. Peer pressure was
generated by providing each worker with private information about the realized productivity
of another worker in a past experimental session, under the same compensation system. Since
productivity varied across individuals, different workers were exposed to differing intensities
of pressure. This design ensures that peer pressure is heterogeneously and exogenously dis-
tributed across subjects. This allows the estimation of the effect of peer pressure intensity on
productivity under both payment systems.
1There is now a good deal of evidence showing that workers do respond to monetary incentives; see Paarsch
and Shearer (1999, 2000) and Lazear (2000) for studies using field data and Shearer (2004) for a field experiment.
2A notable exception is Mas and Moretti (2006).
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We use the data arising from the experiment to consider three issues related to the effec-
tiveness of peer pressure. First, we analyze whether peer pressure is equally as effective as a
motivational tool when workers are paid piece rates as when they are paid fixed wages. Re-
cent evidence suggests that peer pressure can increase productivity when workers are paid a
fixed wage (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2006). However, it is not well understood
whether peer pressure can be an effective tool to raise productivity in workplaces where work-
ers receive explicit financial incentives to perform. One potential reason is that if the marginal
cost of effort is increasing, high effort levels associated with monetary incentives will imply
lower responses to peer pressure. Another reason is that peer pressure may simply be more
conspicuous for workers under fixed wages than those under piece-rates.
Second, we empirically measure the effect of peer pressure intensity on the productivity
of workers under fixed wages and piece rates. In Falk and Ichino (2006), peer pressure was
generated by having pairs of subjects work simultaneously and together. Our experiment, by
posting a signal of peer productivity, allows us to measure the intensity of peer pressure. Con-
sequently, we are able to investigate, not only the average effect of peer pressure, but also detect
non-linearities in the relationship between peer pressure intensity and productivity. Nonlinear-
ities can result from diminishing or increasing returns to peer pressure. They can also result
from the will to conform to the low or high productivity of others (see Bernheim (1994)). Non-
linearities are also predicted by theories of self-assessment developed in social psychology.
These theories raise the possibility that providing workers with feedback on their individual
level of competence can have both positive and negative effects on productivity. For example,
Deci (1975) notes that a person’s self-motivation will increase with feelings of competence, and
decrease with feelings of incompetence. In the case of peer pressure, workers can infer their
own level of competence from signals about the productivity of other workers. A low signal
may increase the feelings of competence and result in productivity increases, whereas a very
high signal may decrease feelings of competence and result in productivity decreases.
Finally, we consider interactions between gender and peer pressure. We systematically an-
alyze the effects of peer pressure intensity on the productivity of women and men, working
under differing levels of explicit incentives and peer pressure. Gender gaps in earnings and
the lower promotion rates of women within the firm are well documented.3 Such differences
3In the Harvard Business Review, it was reported that in 2003 women made up more than half the managerial
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have traditionally been attributed to easily observable differences in abilities, or difficult-to-
measure employer discrimination. An alternative explanation is that men and women may
differ in terms of unobservable abilities which are correlated with social position attainment
within the firm, such as their behaviour under competitive pressures. Recently, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2004) found that within an environment absent incentives, peer pressure signifi-
cantly affected the performance of male children while having no affect on the performance
of female children.4 Our experiment allows us to investigate whether these results are robust
to changes in the motivational environment and to characterize the interactions between peer
pressure, incentives, and gender in the workplace.
We find that there exists no level of peer pressure in our experiment for which the pro-
ductivity of either men or women is significantly higher than without peer pressure. On the
contrary, we find that very low and very high levels of pressure can significantly decrease the
productivity of men paid fixed wages. We argue that the productivity decrease associated
with low levels of peer pressure is consistent with a simple model of conformism. On the
other hand, conformism considerations cannot explain the productivity decrease associated
with high levels of peer pressure. There, we argue that the decrease is consistent with theories
of self-motivation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the experimental
design. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model of peer pressure and incentives. In section
4, we present and analyze the data. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Experimental design
The experiment took place at the laboratory of the Center for Interuniversity Research and
Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO). Participants were recruited via the CIRANO’s list of
participants to previous experiments. The email invitation solicited participants for a session
and professional labour pool, but held only one percent of chief executive positions in Fortune 500 companies.
4Gender differences in the presence of incentives have also been found. Angrist and Levy (2009) find that women
respond significantly to cash incentives in education investments while men do not. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rus-
tichini (2003) find that men increase significantly their effort in tournaments but women do not. Moreover, men
and women are equally productive under piece-rates. Paarsch and Shearer (2007) found no evidence that men and
women responded differently to piece-rate incentives within a tree-planting firm.
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of work lasting 40 minutes. The invitation email also informed participants that they would
receive a 10$ show up fee on the day of the work session. They were further informed that,
depending on the quality of their work, they would receive an additional payment for their
work which would be mailed to them in the week following their participation. More details
about the quality control procedures were given prior to each work session.
The experiment followed a 2 by 2 design, consisting of four treatments. Prior to each
treatment, instructions explaining the task to be performed and the payment system were dis-
tributed and read aloud. The task consisted of entering scorecards of professional golfers into
a database. Workers were informed that the data they entered would be used by university
researchers to conduct their own research. Scorecards were obtained from the web site of the
Professional Golfers Association of America (www.pgatour.com). All scorecards consisted of
four rounds of golf for a given golfer, with each round consisting of 18 holes.5
Each participant was assigned to a work desk consisting of a computer and a data binder
containing the scorecards to be entered into the database. Each page of each binder contained
the scorecard of a professional golfer. Figure 2 presents a sample scorecard. Each golfer is
identified by an ID number located in the top left corner of the page. Each column contains the
scores on each of the 18 holes in a round of golf. A brief presentation showed the participants
how to enter data into the database. In order to facilitate data entry, the entry screen mimicked
the scorecards. Figure 3 presents a snapshot of the entry screen. We note that the golfer ID
number and rounds of golf are positioned in a similar way on both the scorecards and the entry
screen. The entry screen contained two additional components not present on the scorecard
sheets. First, the cell ”# Rnd de de´part” contained the number of rounds of golf already present
in the database at the beginning of the work session. This number remained fixed throughout
the work session. As will be made clear below, this was the cell used to generate peer pressure.
Workers could keep track of their own productivity by looking at the cell ”Votre # Rnd entre´es”
which contained the number of rounds of golf they had entered since the beginning of the work
session. After workers finished entering a scorecard, the entry screen would be refreshed and
the number of rounds of golf entered (”Votre # Rnd entre´es”) would be incremented by 4.
The four experimental treatments captured different work environments, differing accord-
5We did not use the scorecards for golfers who failed to make the cut since this would imply that only two
rounds of golf would be observed.
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ing to the payment system and the amount of peer pressure generated. Participants in a partic-
ular treatment were given information about their own work environment and were unaware
that workers in other sessions worked under different environments. Since the productivity
data from the treatments without peer pressure were used to generate peer pressure, we con-
ducted the treatments without peer pressure first. In treatment FW-NoPP (fixed wage payment
and no peer pressure), participants received a fixed payment of $10 for their work (in addition
to the $10 show-up fee) and received no information about the productivity of other partic-
ipants. In treatment PR-NoPP (piece-rate payment and no peer pressure), participants were
paid $0.10 for each round of golf entered (in addition to the $10 show-up fee) and received no
information about the productivity of other participants. In both treatments, each participant
started entering data in a new database. As a result, the cell ”# Rnd de de´part,” containing the
number of rounds of golf in the database at the beginning of the work session, was set to 0 –
there was no peer pressure for participants during these treatments.6
The other two treatments, FW-PP (fixed wage payment with peer pressure) and PR-PP
(piece-rate payment with peer pressure), were carried out in identical fashion except that peer
pressure was added in an exogenous manner. Each participant in the FW-PP treatment entered
data into a database randomly chosen from the pool of participants in the FW-NoPP treatment
conducted earlier. As a result, the cell ”# Rnd de de´part” contained the number of rounds of
golf entered by another participant paid under a fixed wage system; each participant could
therefore observe both his/her current productivity (in the cell ”Votre # Rnd entre´es”) and the
total productivity of one of his/her peers.7 Because the productivity of participants in the FW-
NoPP varied, the number appearing in the cell ”# Rnd de de´part” varied across workers in the
FW-PP treatment. This ensured that workers in the FW-PP treatment were exposed to differing
intensities of peer pressure.8 Peer pressure was introduced in an similar way during the piece
rate payment system, having participants in the PR-PP treatment enter data into a database of
a randomly chosen participant in the PR-NoPP treatment.
Before participants began entering data, the quality-control system was described; this was
6Participants in these treatments were told that they were the first to enter data into their data base.
7Participants in the peer-pressure treatments were made aware of the cell ”# Rnd de de´part” and told what the
number in it represented.
8Our experimental design can also be seen as providing workers with reference points. Setting reference levels
based on the productivity of peers can also be interpreted as a form of peer pressure.
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the same for all treatments. It consisted of randomly drawing 20% of the rounds entered by a
worker and counting the number of rounds entered with errors. If less than 20% of the rounds
selected for the control contained errors, the participant would receive his/her payment for
all data entered. If more than 20% of the rounds selected for the control contained errors, no
payment would be received for the data entered.9
After exactly 40 minutes of work, a bell rang signaling the end of the work session. Par-
ticipants collected their 10$ show-up fee before leaving the room. In the week following the
experiment, the quality control check was performed, and the payment (if applicable), along
with a description of the results of the quality control, was mailed to each participant.
3 Model
In this section we develop a simple theoretical model of effort decisions under piece rates and
fixed wages that accounts for the effects of peer pressure and self motivation. We ignore quality
decisions on the part of the worker. We consider worker utility to be a (separable) function of
earnings, effort and peer pressure; ie, U(W, E) = W − C(E) − 0.5βi(E − P)2. Here, W repre-
sents individual earnings, C(E) represents the cost of effort and P represents the level of peer
pressure (or the signal of peer productivity). βi(E− P)2 represents a loss function, capturing
the cost to the worker of differing from his/her peer signal, and βi > 0 is a parameter capturing
sensitivity to peer pressure.
The theoretical concept of self-motivation implies that effort is supplied independently of
monetary rewards so that workers will supply effort under fixed wages. To capture this in an
empirically tractable manner, we specify a cost of effort function of the form
(1) C(E) = κi
γi
(γi + 1)
E
(γi+1)
γi − ηiE, κi > 0, γi > 0, ηi > 0.
where κi denotes an individual productivity parameter and γi denotes a parameter capturing
the curvature of the cost of effort function. Note, since the marginal cost of effort is negative at
zero effort, individuals will supply positive effort levels under a fixed wage. We interpret ηi to
be a self-motivation parameter in our model. All parameters (β, γ, κ, η) are subscripted with i
to denote that they can vary across workers.
9The worker would still receive the $10 show-up fee.
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Since there is no inherent risk in typing golf scores (little affects productivity beyond worker
actions), we take output to be worker effort; ie, Y = E. Earnings are given by
(2) W =

rY if payment by piece rates
ω if payment by fixed wages.
Let Ipr be a function indicating that the worker was paid piece rates and Is be a function
indicating that the worker received a peer-pressure signal. Optimal output choice, denoted
y∗ = e∗, then satisfies the equation
(3) rIpr − κie∗
1
γi + ηi − βi(e∗ − P)Is = 0.
Notice that ηi > 0 is a necessary condition for positive output under fixed wages in the absence
of peer pressure. Since explicit financial incentives are equal to zero, a worker only supplies
positive effort if he/she has some level of self-motivation to work.10 The model, while not
giving rise to closed form solutions, does provide a number of empirical predictions. Taking
the total derivative of (3) gives
(4)
[
κi
γi
e∗
(1−γi)
γi + βi Is
]
de = Iprdr + dηi + IsβidP.
1. Workers react positively to increases in the piece rate:
∂e∗
∂r
=
[
κi
γi
e∗
(1−γi)
γi + βi Is
]−1
> 0.
2. Workers react positively to peer pressure:
∂e∗
∂P
= βi
[
κi
γi
e∗
(1−γi)
γi + βi
]−1
> 0.
3. The effects of peer pressure diminish with the level of explicit incentives if γi < 1:11
∂2e∗
∂r∂P
= −βi
[
κi
γi
e∗
(1−γi)
γi + βi
]−2 κi
γ2i
(1− γ)e∗
(1−2γi)
γi
∂e∗
∂r
< 0.
This implies that the effects of peer pressure on productivity caused by changes in self-
motivation are greater in magnitude when workers are paid fixed wages than when
10Second-order-sufficient conditions for optimal effort are given by: κi > 0, γi > 0, βi > 0.
11Paarsch and Shearer (2007) estimate γi to be equal to 0.39 using data from a field experiment.
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workers are paid piece-rates. The condition γi < 1 corresponds to C′′′(e) > 0, or greater
than quadratic costs. Intuitively, workers exert more effort in response to increases in ex-
plicit financial incentives. By increasing their effort, workers also increase their marginal
cost of effort, making it more costly for them to respond to peer pressure. This is one
motivation for the conjecture that explicit financial incentives may crowd out the effects
of peer pressure on productivity.
4. Effort in the presence of a peer-pressure signal of zero, denoted e∗(P = 0), is lower than
is effort in the absence of peer pressure, denoted e˜. To see this, let
(5) ψ(e) = κie
1
γi + βie− Iprr− ηi
and note that ψ (e∗(P = 0)) = 0. In the absence of a signal, e˜ solves
(6) κi e˜1/γi = Iprr + ηi.
Evaluating ψ(e) at e˜ then gives
(7) ψ(e˜) = κi e˜
1
γi + βe˜− Iprr− ηi > 0
from (6). What is more,
(8) ψ′(e) =
κi
γi
e
1−γi
γi + βi > 0 ∀e > 0.
It therefore follows that e∗(P = 0) < e˜.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Aggregate results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of productivity, quality of work, age and gender for all
four treatments. Because of our randomized experimental design, the average age of our work-
ers (27.45) and the proportions of women and men are similar across treatments.12 We find that
workers entered an average of 85.33 rounds13 when paid a fixed wage without peer pressure.
Because workers knew they were hired for a single day of work, we rule out the possibility
12The age of our participants ranges from 19 to 59.
13This represents gross productivity, without regard for quality.
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that this level of productivity reflects concerns for future employment. As a result, we interpret
productivity in the fixed wage treatment without peer pressure as evidence of considerable
self-motivation. Surprisingly, we find that the average productivity of workers paid a fixed
wage and exposed to peer pressure is 82.20 rounds of golf, slightly lower than the average
productivity of workers without peer pressure.
The incentive effects of using piece-rates are present both with and without peer-pressure.
We find that workers entered an average of 107.18 rounds without peer pressure, an increase
of 25.6% relative to the fixed wage treatment without peer pressure. Similarly, an average of
114.05 rounds were entered in the piece-rate treatment with peer pressure, an increase of 38.7%
relative to the average productivity in the fixed wage treatment with peer pressure.14
Figure 1 presents the distributions of the number of rounds entered containing mistakes for
the four treatments. We find similar distributions of mistakes with and without peer pressure,
given a payment system. Across payment systems, workers are more likely to make a mistake
when paid a piece-rate rather than when paid a fixed wage.
4.2 Regression results
Productivity
We measure productivity yi as the total number of rounds of golf entered without mistakes.15
The mistakes are analyzed separately below. We first estimate the following model of the nat-
ural logarithm of productivity
(9) ln(yi) = β0 + β1PRi + β2PPi + β3 p−i,i + β4 p2−i,i + ε i
where PRi denotes a binary variable taking a value of 1 when participant i is paid a piece-rate,
and 0 otherwise. Similarly, PPi denotes a binary variable taking a value of 1 when participant
i is taking part in a treatment with peer pressure, and 0 otherwise. The effect of peer pressure
14These results are in line with existing empirical evidence from observational studies and field experiments
which find that productivity increases when workers are paid piece-rates rather than fixed wages (Lazear, 2000;
Paarsch and Shearer, 2000; Shearer, 2004)
15By excluding mistakes, we overcome the problems of having to infer the productive value of rounds entered
with various degrees of mistakes.
10
intensity is captured by including a linear and quadratic term in p−i,i, representing the signal
that participant i received about the productivity of a randomly matched participant−i. Recall
from Section 2 that this signal corresponds to the gross productivity of the matched participant.
The quadratic term in p−i,i was added to capture possible non-linearities between the level of
peer pressure and productivity. Finally, ε i is a random component assumed to satisfy the con-
ditional median restriction Med(ε i|PRi, PPi, p−i,i) = 0. This gives rise to a median regression
model. Quantile restrictions are typically weaker than the more traditional conditional mean
restrictions of the OLS estimator. Furthermore, median regressions are known to be robust
outliers (See Koenker (2005)).16
Our theoretical model developed in Section 3 implies a number of restrictions on the pa-
rameters of (9). Result 1 suggests that workers will react positively to piece rates, implying
that β1 > 0. Result 2 suggests that workers will react positively to peer pressure, implying that
β3 + 2β4 p−i,i > 0.17 Result 4 suggests effort in the presence of a very low peer-pressure signal
is lower than is effort in the absence of peer pressure, implying that β2 < 0.
We first estimated 9 combining data for men and women. We then ran regressions for men
and women separately. Our results are presented in Table (2) under the columns ”FW and PR”.
We find that workers supplied significantly more effort when paid a piece-rate relative to a
fixed wage, consistent Result 1. All other variables are insignificant. Separate regressions for
men and women produced similar results.
Peer pressure and mode of compensation
The regression model in (9) imposes the restriction that the effect of peer pressure on produc-
tivity is the same under both payments systems. More generally, the effect of peer pressure
may depend on the compensation system. As shown in Section 3, our theoretical model pre-
dicts that the effect of peer pressure on productivity under fixed wages will be different than
the corresponding effect under piece-rates (if γ 6= 1). To investigate this, we estimated (9) sepa-
rately for the piece-rate and fixed-wage treatments.18 Results for the fixed-wage and piece-rate
16OLS estimates of our model parameters are qualitatively similar to those presented in this section but are asso-
ciated with substantially larger standard errors. A table of results is available upon request.
17Result 3, suggesting that the effect of peer pressure should be smaller under piece rates, is not testable in this
specification. We expand our specification in the next section to consider this.
18We omit the variable PRi from these regressions as its effect is no longer identified.
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treatments are presented in Table 2 under the columns ”FW only” and ”PR only” respectively.
We first discuss results using all participants (combining men and women). Under piece-
rates, we find that the dummy variable PPi and the linear term in p−i,i are both insignificant
at conventional levels. The quadratic term in p−i,i is positive and marginally significant at the
10% level, suggesting that peer pressure has some positive effect on productivity, consistent
with Result 2.19 Under fixed wages we find that the dummy variable PPi has a negative and
significant effect on productivity. This is consistent with Result 4 of the model of conformism
set forth in Section 3. In particular, participants who receive low signals about the produc-
tivity of their matched participant are significantly less productive than participants who re-
ceive no signal about the productivity of others. The level of peer pressure, captured by the
variable p−i,i, also plays a significant role under fixed wages. We find that the linear term is
positive while the quadratic term is negative, suggesting a concave relationship. These results
are broadly consistent with Result 2 – the increases in peer pressure have a positive effect on
productivity, at least over some range.
These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained when we run separate regressions
for men and women under fixed wages. In particular, the binary variable PPi is negative
and significant for men and women, although the magnitude of the effect appears greater for
men. The effect of peer pressure intensity and productivity is also concave for both men and
women.20
In line with results obtained combining all participants, we find that the behaviour of men
and women under fixed wages differs significantly from their behaviour under piece rates.
Contrary to the fixed-wage case, the binary variable PPi is not significant, for either men or
women, under piece rates. This implies that men and women are only willing to reduce their
effort to conform to the low effort of another worker when there are no financial consequences
of doing so. Finally, contrary to the fixed-wage case, the linear and quadratic variables of peer-
pressure intensity p−i,i are both individually insignificant for men and women under piece
rates. However, it bears mention that the linear and quadratic variables are jointly significant
19The linear and quadratic variables in p−i,i are jointly significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.0811).
20We also estimated models controlling for the effect of age. To proceed, we interacted the treatment variable PP
and the linear and quadratic variables of peer pressure intensity with age. We find that our results are robust to this
control but are generally insignificant due to the small number of degrees of freedom.
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for men (p-value = 0.001) but not for women (p-value = 0.889).
To better understand the interaction of peer pressure and the mode of compensation, we
plot, in Figure 4, the predicted logarithm of productivity of men (top two graphs) and women
(bottom two graphs) under fixed wages (first column of graphs) and piece rates (second column
of graphs). We include in each graph the predicted productivity of workers in the absence of
peer pressure (ie. flat lines). The response curves of men and women under piece rates are both
negatively sloped, with a slightly steeper curve for men. Clearly, increases in peer pressure are
not predicted to have any beneficial effect on the productivity of workers under piece rates.
The response curve of women under fixed wages is substantially flatter that that of men,
suggesting that women respond less to peer pressure than do men. Men are predicted to react
negatively to either very low and very high peer-pressure signals relative to a moderate signal.
Again these results are broadly consistent with our model, at least for low levels of peer
pressure. As discussed above, the response to low peer pressure signals can be explained by
our model of conformism (Result 4). What is more, the reaction to increases in peer pressure
is stronger under fixed wages than under piece rates (Result 3). It is also clear, however, that
our model does not explain the negative reactions of workers at high levels of peer pressure.
A possible explanation for this effect is provided by theories of self-assessment and motivation
(see Deci (1975)). There it is argued that a person’s self-motivation can decrease with feelings
of incompetence. Hence, a high signal about the productivity of another worker may decrease
feelings of competence and result in the productivity decreases which are captured in our ex-
periment. Such an effect appears to be more important for men than women.
Finally, Figure 4 highlights the limited effect of peer pressure on productivity within our
experiment. There was no level of peer pressure in the experiment for which the productivity
of either men or women was significantly higher than without any pressure. In contrast, our
results suggest that peer pressure can significantly decrease productivity (particularly for men)
when the productivity signal is either very low or very high.
Quality
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of rounds entered with mistakes in each of the
four treatments. We find that, both with and without peer pressure, the proportions of subjects
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not making any mistakes was higher when workers were paid a fixed wage than when they
were paid a piece rate. This pattern is consistent with workers substituting quantity for quality
under piece rates (see Stiglitz (1975), Lazear (1986) for theoretical discussions of this issue and
Paarsch and Shearer (2000) for an empirical treatment within an actual firm).
To investigate systematically the relationship between quality of the work, incentives, and
gender, let N be the number of workers in the experiment, and ybi ∈ {0, 1, ..} denote the number
of mistakes of worker i, where i = 1, 2, ..., N. We assume that ybi follows a negative binomial
distribution whose first two moments are assumed to satisfy
E (ybi|xi) = exp(x′iα)
V (ybi|xi) =
(
1+ θ exp(x′iα)
)
exp(x′iα)
such that θ ≥ 0. This parameterization allows the conditional variance to exceed the con-
ditional mean, a phenomena known as overdispersion and which is frequently observed in
count data models (see Cameron and Trivedi 1998). A special case is the Poisson distribution
(with θ = 0), characterized by equidispersion (the conditional variance equals the conditional
mean). Estimation of α and θ was performed by Maximum Likelihood.
The model was estimated first by combining data of men and women participants. We next
estimated separate models for men and women participants.21 Results of these regressions
appear under the column label ”Quality” in Table 2.
Looking first at the combined results, we find that the number of mistakes is significantly
higher under piece rates than under fixed wages. This is consistent with the observations made
earlier in Figure 1. The number of mistakes significantly decreases when workers receive a very
low peer pressure signal. Moreover, the relationship between the number of mistakes and the
level of peer pressure is significantly concave.
Looking at men only, we find that working under piece rates significantly increases the
number of mistakes made. Moreover, there is a weak negative effect of the variable PP, hinting
that men may make less mistakes when receiving a low signal about the productivity of another
worker. Finally, we find that none of the peer pressure variables significantly affect the quality
21A log-likelihood ratio test easily rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the men and women regres-
sions are the same (χ28 = 29.128, p-value = 0.0003).
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of the work of women. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that women working under
piece rates make the same number of mistakes than women working under fixed wages.
5 Conclusions
We have presented results from a real effort experiment where the payment system and the
intensity of peer pressure were both varied exogenously among workers. Our experimental
design allowed us to estimate the effect of peer pressure intensity on the productivity of men
and women workers under both fixed wages and piece rates.
To interpret our findings, we presented a simple model of conformism. Our model builds
on two key elements. First, we assume that workers have heterogeneous predispositions to
work in the absence of incentives. Second, workers have heterogeneous needs to supply a
level of effort which conforms with the effort level of another worker. These considerations,
interacted with the presence of explicit incentives, produce clear predictions which were tested
using our experimental data.
Our main results were the following. First, we found that the productivity of women was
not strongly affected by the level of peer pressure when paid either a fixed wage or a piece rate.
The productivity of men on the other hand was significantly affected by peer pressure, both
under fixed wages and to a lesser extent under piece rates. Under fixed wages, we found a
significant non-linear relationship between the productivity of men and the level of peer pres-
sure they face. In particular, we found that men significantly reduce their productivity when
given a very low signal about the productivity of another worker. This response is consistent
with the model of conformism presented in Section 3, where it was argued that workers have
an incentive to reduce the distance between their effort and that of another worker. On the
other hand, high levels of peer pressure were found to have a significant negative effect on
productivity, an effect which is inconsistent with our model of conformism. We have argued
that the latter decline in productivity is broadly consistent with theories of self-motivation, ac-
cording to which too much peer pressure can decrease a worker’s own feelings of competence,
and thus his self-motivation and productivity. Moreover, conformism and self-motivation con-
siderations appear to be muted when male workers are paid piece rates. Indeed, we found a
small (although significant) negative effect of peer pressure on productivity which contrasts
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with the effect of peer pressure under fixed wages. Overall, these results suggest that our sim-
ple model of conformism, while being able to predict many responses to peer pressure, should
be generalized to better predict responses under very high levels of peer pressure.
While we find that the level of peer pressure can affect productivity, there is little to suggest
that the level of productivity will be higher in the presence of peer pressure than in its absence.
These results suggest that peer pressure has a limited range of effectiveness as an incentive-
policy tool and can in some cases (eg. men under fixed wages) lead to significant productivity
decreases.
Finally, our results demonstrate the usefulness of experimental methods for analyzing mo-
tivational models by generating random variation in (unobservable) forcing variables. Peer
effects are difficult to measure in real firms. The work of Falk and Ichino (2006) as well as
that of Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) demonstrated that it can be generated in laboratory (like)
environments. Here, we have generated exogenous variation in peer pressure, allowing us to
uncover nonlinearities in its effect on productivity. The random matching of workers ensures
that every worker has a positive probability of being matched with a worker of higher or lower
ability.
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Figure 1: Number of rounds of golf entered with mistakes across the four treatments.
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Numéro du golfeur : 23
Trou 0 Rnd 4 0 Rnd 3 0 Rnd 2 0 Rnd 1
1 0 5 0 4 0 3 0 4
2 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3
3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 4
4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4
5 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 4
6 0 5 0 4 0 5 0 5
7 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4
8 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3
9 0 4 0 5 0 3 0 4
10 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4
11 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 3
12 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 7
13 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3
14 0 4 0 5 0 4 0 4
15 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3
16 0 4 0 4 0 5 0 4
17 0 4 0 5 0 4 0 4
18 0 4 0 5 0 5 0 4
Figure 2: Sample scorecard taken from a worker’s booklet.
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Figure 3: Snapshot of the data entry screen.
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Figure 4: Predicted log productivity of men and women under fixed wages and piece rates.
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